Some Ramifications of the GRP-MILF Peace Process

Maugan Buat Mosaid, Ph.D.

The GRP-MILF Peace Agreement, when it comes, should be something different. First, the GRP is not expected to renegotiate what was already ‘settled’ with the MNLF. Second, there is much to learn from the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement from inherent flaws in the document itself to weak implementing mechanisms.

The GRP missed the point that a satisfactory rating in the implementation of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement would be a good incentive for the next best thing to do - to negotiate with the MILF. Or, in fairness, this may have been at the back of the minds of people involved in the implementation of the agreement, but only the government was less sincere or less capable, or both, to fully implement all the provisions and requirements of the final peace agreement to a satisfactory level.

What was supposed to come out as a good term of reference for a GRP-MILF negotiation to follow through came out later as good examples to stay away from. But there is no use crying over spilled milk. At this point, it will suffice that the MILF may take cognizance of the following:

1) To be lured into signing an unfunded agreement

The MNLF had to practically mendicate for much needed funds while there was no congressional appropriation to implement the provisions of the Final Peace Agreement. Initially the President’s Social Fund, though meager, had to take care of everything to ‘start the ball rolling.’

It was untenable to think why the funding requirement could be overlooked when Congress has authority to pass ‘continuing appropriation’ that stays on until it is expended.

2) To have an ‘agreement’ that is marred by open-ended provisions

The GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement was marred by open-ended provisions which were all subjugated to the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution and the numbers game in Congress. Commenting on Sen. Miriam Santiago’s proposal to file a complaint against Trillanes’ fiasco at the Manila Peninsula, Sen. ‘Chiz’ Escudero said, “now they don’t have the numbers on their side; something that they had used effectively against us when I was with the lower house.” You can see how the truism of logic can be thwarted, sometimes, by the game of numbers in Congress.

The American Indians got better deals from the US government under some settlements negotiated and granted outside the dominions of Congress and the Federal Constitution. The American Indian Movement (AIM) became very prominent in the late 1950s until early 1960s due to repressive policies begun under the Eisenhower administration.

Apparently, the GRP is not ready to explore extra-Constitutional means and out-of-Congress settlements to address the so-called ‘Mindanao problem’. Instead, the GRP negotiators have effectively used the Constitution and Congress as defense mechanisms whenever it is confronted with ‘controversial’ counter-proposals from the MILF. This can be gleaned from the words of Sec. Silvestre Afable, former Chair of the GRP Panel; “What the MILF wants is not possible to negotiate under the present terms of reference of the GRP peace panel”.

3) The GRP uses ‘sweet and sour’ tactics in the negotiation

The GRP panel is in charge of the ‘sweet’ strategies while the AFP takes charge of the ‘sour’ tactics. Before 2004 and until the assumption of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), batch 2 last year, it has become a pattern that armed confrontations on the ground would always occur a few days before or after the scheduled talks.

The MILF should not show impatience when negotiation is stalled by some critical disagreements or by simple dilly-dallying of the GRP as if it wants an ‘agreement’ more than the government. This is not basketball where the team who is more aggressive to have it is more likely to win the game.

4) Fast-tracking the agreement

The next thing that the GRP impresses upon the MILF is to fast-track the ‘agreement’ because time is of the essence. This was what the GRP did to the MNLF when the negotiation was on the verge of collapsing. The fast-tracking was so fast that the MNLF was mesmerized into agreeing with an ‘agreement’ that was drafted overnight by some Malacaňang boys.

On the resumption of the talks in 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was very optimistic that a final agreement would be signed “soon”. The “soon” overshot two years without significant strides to look upon. As of May this year, three of the four issues on ancestral domain had been resolved. Only the question on territory remained but that proved to be the toughest to hurdle. While both Parties had agreed to the definition on ‘contiguity’ they had not settled on the number of Muslim-dominated villages that would finally comprise the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. The GRP panel would consider more than 600 while the MILF insisted on more than a thousand. This number is over and above the present area of the ARMM.

The issue on territory may have been hurdled if the Philippine government heeded the appeal of the Malaysian talks facilitator Othman Abdul Razak to have a stronger political will to come up with an offer that would satisfy the MILF. Apparently the GRP was not moved by the suggestion as it is not in a hurry to close the deal with the MILF.

What would be there to hurry on, on the part of government, except as an offensive gambit to do a repeat of the strategy used on the MNLF?

5) What about a legislated ‘Bangsamoro Homeland’?

Yes, it might help toying with the idea of a legislated ‘Bangsamoro Homeland’ before signing a final peace agreement to see how sincere and how far the GRP would go.

This is not a political bribe. Following the GRP panel’s consistent stand, any geo-political realignment of territorial boundaries shall have to be sanctioned by Congress.

If Israel can grant a ‘Palestinian Homeland’ amidst a deeply rooted conflict characterized by so much hate and killings, the Philippines, where Muslims and Christians are in talking terms and peaceful co-habitation, is in a better position to do so. Surely, it is not necessary to wait for a similar situation before the same settlement can be made possible.

And when the GRP does the same, there is no missing a good point the second time around – to finally put to rest the ‘Moro uprisings’ in Mindanao which the Spaniards and Americans were not able to contain when they once held political power and control over the Philippine Islands.
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(Cotabato City; December 2007; Email: maxim61156@yahoo.com)