Maugan Buat Mosaid, Ph.D.
Eleven years after its signing, the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement of 1996 generated more questions than answers. Whatever happened to it now? Did it fail or was it designed to fail? Is it still in the process of implementation or has it reached a dead-end?
In the beginning many Bangsamoro pinned so much hope in the agreement as something that would improve their lives or at least the start of better things to come. No less than the OIC expressed so much optimism when it said: “The 1996 peace agreement is the just, comprehensive and lasting fulfillment of the Filipino Muslims’ quest for effective autonomy and meaningful self-determination under the Philippine Constitution.”
But after all these years, the Philippine government and the MNLF are consistently making two different versions of the status of implementation of the agreement. On one hand, the government says the provisions of the agreement have been substantially implemented in “letter and spirit”. On the other hand, the MNLF claims that the substantial provisions of the agreement had not been implemented which was the reason why the MNLF had insisted that the implementation be reviewed with the participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference. In November 2007 the review did take place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and per newspaper account, the outcome was the same: there were two different versions of the status of implementation of the agreement claimed by the two sides.
All along, the status of implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement bred some questions like the following:
Who is telling the truth?
Several studies and commentaries had been made to this effect to understand the real status of implementation of the agreement as well as its impact on the lives of people who were supposed to benefit out of such undertaking. Examples of these studies were those of the OIC, Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID), and Institute of Autonomous Governance (IAG).
These studies, though not categorical, all pointed to the failure in the implementation of the agreement in its “letter and spirit”. Some of the specific important provisions which were allegedly unimplemented are: non-implementation of the Regional Security Forces, meager financial resources allotted to the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (as if it was designed to fail), non-pursuance of the proposed mini-marshal plan for Muslim Mindanao, superficial accommodation of qualified Muslims in the cabinet or cabinet-ranked positions, dis-enfranchisement of the MNLF in the expanded ARMM (RA 9054). Where indeed lies the problem?
Is it the Failure of the GRP to Implement Important Provisions of the Agreement?
The government claims that after the signing of RA 9054 and the subsequent plebiscite, it has started its commitment to the agreement and after 10 years the implementation is as good as completed. In many instances that the GRP had to make its report of accomplishment, there was no mention of how to pursue the remaining unimplemented provisions of the agreement.
Or is it the Inability of the MNLF to Implement Effective Administration and Governance?
The government claims that the administration of the ARMM by the MNLF was characterized by absenteeism, neglect and some allegation of corruption and that Nur Misuari had been passive and did not exercise adequate responsibility to govern well. The government claimed further that the peace agreement was supposed “to build institutions for peace rather than personalities and so despite Nur Misuari the implementation must go on.” It is this perception that divided the MNLF and the eventual incarceration of its Chairman, Nur Misuari.
The MNLF would counter that it is the lack of power and non-implementation of important provisions of the agreement that renders it inutile.
Is it Inadequacy of Resources or Mismanagement of Resources?
The government says that from 1996 to 2000 the total amount of funds released for various programs and projects in the ARMM and the SPCPD has reached P67.7 billion. Though this might have been true the MNLF claimed that the greater bulk of these funds were regular national government assistance that had been earmarked for the ARMM even without the Agreement. There were only meager funds generated by the Peace Agreement if the tasks of re-integration, rebuilding and reconstruction were to be considered.
Is it the built-in weaknesses/defects in the Agreement itself?
That the agreement does not have built-in power to effect good governance and social change may not be good reasons why such concerns were not substantially pursued. After all, the peace pact does not implement itself but by adequate policy support, timely provision of resources, effective delivery mechanism, and above all, sincerity in the commitment that the peace agreement succeeds.
Is it Misinterpretation of the Agreement?
How was the mineral resources understood by the GRP and the MNLF? What about the so-called “Mini-Marshall Plan”, provisional government and security? Any differences in the interpretation of the agreement, if ever, shall be resolved in the light of the Philippine Constitution and existing laws (par 153, FPA) or shall be resolved by the tripartite committee and that any unilateral act is deemed illegal.
So, where did it go wrong? Is it partly or all of the above?
These are various schools of thought, perceptions, speculations in the light of what many sectors consider failure of the GRP-MNLF agreement to deliver what was expected of it in the beginning.
The MNLF-GRP peace accord is a very important document in more ways than one.
First, it is an agreement duly facilitated and witnessed by the international communities which is morally binding for both the MNLF and the government to enforce. There has never been an agreement of that stature in our immediate past history. It was considered by the OIC as a just, comprehensive and lasting fulfillment of the Filipino Muslims’ quest for effective autonomy and meaningful self-determination under the Philippine constitution.
Second, the same agreement could have been a source for peace in Mindanao. With all the splendor, fame and special attention given to it by the Ramos administration and the international donor institutions it was such a powerful document that could have made a difference in terms of drawing the MNLF combatants into the mainstream social and political milieu.
Third, it has become an acid test to the sincerity and political will of the government in waging peace in Mindanao. Apparently, it fell short of this expectation. Is the government interested only in signing agreements and not in peace?
Fourth, it is also a barometer whether an agreement becomes successful when it is confined to the ambit of the constitution, especially in a one nation state where the fate of the minority is at the mercy of the majority.
And fifth, it could have become a good term of reference for the next best thing to do, i.e. to negotiate with the MILF.
The MNLF, at least many of its members, strongly believes that had the agreement been fully implemented in its entirety, it could have spelled the difference in the lives of the Bangsamoro or at least that is what they thought. And that is not impossible.
The agreement may not be the end all solution to the centuries-old problems in the Bangsamoro homeland, but given adequate resources, power, determination and capacity, it can indeed make a difference and it may not have caused the internal conflict in the MNLF, the incarceration of its chairperson and the problems it all created.
A Food for thought
Studies show that the most critical years immediately after signing an agreement or end of conflict is the first 1-5 years. Many countries experienced recurrence of violence within this time when things are not properly handled. Debate within the rebel front happens but it is a part of re-integration and reconstruction.
This should not be fueled by government to divide the group. It happened in the MNLF case and there was strong suspicion that National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales had a hand in the division of the MNLF. During this time, the so-called 15-man Council was formed with the expectation that it will regenerate the diminishing integrity of its Chair Nur Misuari.
If the division was deliberately influenced by some personalities in government, it achieved its purpose in terms of sowing confusion within the MNLF ranks and discrediting its key leaders.
If the government had been sincere it could have taken extra step to refer the issues to the OIC to prevent what had happened. Had the tripartite committee met earlier, it could have been a different story.
Is there a way out?
The long overdue way is to talk; the tripartite meeting could have been convened much earlier. Unfortunately, it took years before the government realized the urgency of this move or only after the damage had been done. One thing is clear: the government has been only occasionally enthusiastic in the implementation of the agreement while all throughout it has been passive.
“There is no more use crying over spilled milk”, as the saying goes, but what happened to the MNLF-GRP agreement has already become a lesson learned. As wise people say, “it is unforgivable stupidity to get bitten by a snake twice in the same hole”.
Implications of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks
The MILF, in their peace talks with the government, has become extra cautious in striking a deal with the latter. In their view, this government has not learned the art of implementing agreements as shown by the GRP-MNLF agreement of 1996. The sincerity and political will of this government is at stake. This, in a way slowed down and made the process more difficult for the MILF and the GRP.
On the other hand, a successful implementation could have produced a positive impact on the GRP-MILF talks, on the lives of the people and on the over-all peace and security of the region. Successful implementation could have also won the sympathy of foreign countries like the OIC and the international development institutions to help provide necessary development assistance in various forms.
But, as of now, the government and the MNLF did not err in their prediction that “failure of implementation could lead to a continuing armed conflict which in the long run will debilitate the strength and resources of the nation”.
Eleven years after its signing, the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement of 1996 generated more questions than answers. Whatever happened to it now? Did it fail or was it designed to fail? Is it still in the process of implementation or has it reached a dead-end?
In the beginning many Bangsamoro pinned so much hope in the agreement as something that would improve their lives or at least the start of better things to come. No less than the OIC expressed so much optimism when it said: “The 1996 peace agreement is the just, comprehensive and lasting fulfillment of the Filipino Muslims’ quest for effective autonomy and meaningful self-determination under the Philippine Constitution.”
But after all these years, the Philippine government and the MNLF are consistently making two different versions of the status of implementation of the agreement. On one hand, the government says the provisions of the agreement have been substantially implemented in “letter and spirit”. On the other hand, the MNLF claims that the substantial provisions of the agreement had not been implemented which was the reason why the MNLF had insisted that the implementation be reviewed with the participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference. In November 2007 the review did take place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and per newspaper account, the outcome was the same: there were two different versions of the status of implementation of the agreement claimed by the two sides.
All along, the status of implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement bred some questions like the following:
Who is telling the truth?
Several studies and commentaries had been made to this effect to understand the real status of implementation of the agreement as well as its impact on the lives of people who were supposed to benefit out of such undertaking. Examples of these studies were those of the OIC, Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID), and Institute of Autonomous Governance (IAG).
These studies, though not categorical, all pointed to the failure in the implementation of the agreement in its “letter and spirit”. Some of the specific important provisions which were allegedly unimplemented are: non-implementation of the Regional Security Forces, meager financial resources allotted to the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (as if it was designed to fail), non-pursuance of the proposed mini-marshal plan for Muslim Mindanao, superficial accommodation of qualified Muslims in the cabinet or cabinet-ranked positions, dis-enfranchisement of the MNLF in the expanded ARMM (RA 9054). Where indeed lies the problem?
Is it the Failure of the GRP to Implement Important Provisions of the Agreement?
The government claims that after the signing of RA 9054 and the subsequent plebiscite, it has started its commitment to the agreement and after 10 years the implementation is as good as completed. In many instances that the GRP had to make its report of accomplishment, there was no mention of how to pursue the remaining unimplemented provisions of the agreement.
Or is it the Inability of the MNLF to Implement Effective Administration and Governance?
The government claims that the administration of the ARMM by the MNLF was characterized by absenteeism, neglect and some allegation of corruption and that Nur Misuari had been passive and did not exercise adequate responsibility to govern well. The government claimed further that the peace agreement was supposed “to build institutions for peace rather than personalities and so despite Nur Misuari the implementation must go on.” It is this perception that divided the MNLF and the eventual incarceration of its Chairman, Nur Misuari.
The MNLF would counter that it is the lack of power and non-implementation of important provisions of the agreement that renders it inutile.
Is it Inadequacy of Resources or Mismanagement of Resources?
The government says that from 1996 to 2000 the total amount of funds released for various programs and projects in the ARMM and the SPCPD has reached P67.7 billion. Though this might have been true the MNLF claimed that the greater bulk of these funds were regular national government assistance that had been earmarked for the ARMM even without the Agreement. There were only meager funds generated by the Peace Agreement if the tasks of re-integration, rebuilding and reconstruction were to be considered.
Is it the built-in weaknesses/defects in the Agreement itself?
That the agreement does not have built-in power to effect good governance and social change may not be good reasons why such concerns were not substantially pursued. After all, the peace pact does not implement itself but by adequate policy support, timely provision of resources, effective delivery mechanism, and above all, sincerity in the commitment that the peace agreement succeeds.
Is it Misinterpretation of the Agreement?
How was the mineral resources understood by the GRP and the MNLF? What about the so-called “Mini-Marshall Plan”, provisional government and security? Any differences in the interpretation of the agreement, if ever, shall be resolved in the light of the Philippine Constitution and existing laws (par 153, FPA) or shall be resolved by the tripartite committee and that any unilateral act is deemed illegal.
So, where did it go wrong? Is it partly or all of the above?
These are various schools of thought, perceptions, speculations in the light of what many sectors consider failure of the GRP-MNLF agreement to deliver what was expected of it in the beginning.
The MNLF-GRP peace accord is a very important document in more ways than one.
First, it is an agreement duly facilitated and witnessed by the international communities which is morally binding for both the MNLF and the government to enforce. There has never been an agreement of that stature in our immediate past history. It was considered by the OIC as a just, comprehensive and lasting fulfillment of the Filipino Muslims’ quest for effective autonomy and meaningful self-determination under the Philippine constitution.
Second, the same agreement could have been a source for peace in Mindanao. With all the splendor, fame and special attention given to it by the Ramos administration and the international donor institutions it was such a powerful document that could have made a difference in terms of drawing the MNLF combatants into the mainstream social and political milieu.
Third, it has become an acid test to the sincerity and political will of the government in waging peace in Mindanao. Apparently, it fell short of this expectation. Is the government interested only in signing agreements and not in peace?
Fourth, it is also a barometer whether an agreement becomes successful when it is confined to the ambit of the constitution, especially in a one nation state where the fate of the minority is at the mercy of the majority.
And fifth, it could have become a good term of reference for the next best thing to do, i.e. to negotiate with the MILF.
The MNLF, at least many of its members, strongly believes that had the agreement been fully implemented in its entirety, it could have spelled the difference in the lives of the Bangsamoro or at least that is what they thought. And that is not impossible.
The agreement may not be the end all solution to the centuries-old problems in the Bangsamoro homeland, but given adequate resources, power, determination and capacity, it can indeed make a difference and it may not have caused the internal conflict in the MNLF, the incarceration of its chairperson and the problems it all created.
A Food for thought
Studies show that the most critical years immediately after signing an agreement or end of conflict is the first 1-5 years. Many countries experienced recurrence of violence within this time when things are not properly handled. Debate within the rebel front happens but it is a part of re-integration and reconstruction.
This should not be fueled by government to divide the group. It happened in the MNLF case and there was strong suspicion that National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales had a hand in the division of the MNLF. During this time, the so-called 15-man Council was formed with the expectation that it will regenerate the diminishing integrity of its Chair Nur Misuari.
If the division was deliberately influenced by some personalities in government, it achieved its purpose in terms of sowing confusion within the MNLF ranks and discrediting its key leaders.
If the government had been sincere it could have taken extra step to refer the issues to the OIC to prevent what had happened. Had the tripartite committee met earlier, it could have been a different story.
Is there a way out?
The long overdue way is to talk; the tripartite meeting could have been convened much earlier. Unfortunately, it took years before the government realized the urgency of this move or only after the damage had been done. One thing is clear: the government has been only occasionally enthusiastic in the implementation of the agreement while all throughout it has been passive.
“There is no more use crying over spilled milk”, as the saying goes, but what happened to the MNLF-GRP agreement has already become a lesson learned. As wise people say, “it is unforgivable stupidity to get bitten by a snake twice in the same hole”.
Implications of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks
The MILF, in their peace talks with the government, has become extra cautious in striking a deal with the latter. In their view, this government has not learned the art of implementing agreements as shown by the GRP-MNLF agreement of 1996. The sincerity and political will of this government is at stake. This, in a way slowed down and made the process more difficult for the MILF and the GRP.
On the other hand, a successful implementation could have produced a positive impact on the GRP-MILF talks, on the lives of the people and on the over-all peace and security of the region. Successful implementation could have also won the sympathy of foreign countries like the OIC and the international development institutions to help provide necessary development assistance in various forms.
But, as of now, the government and the MNLF did not err in their prediction that “failure of implementation could lead to a continuing armed conflict which in the long run will debilitate the strength and resources of the nation”.
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