The White Handkerchief

Short Story

Maugan P. Mosaid, Ph.D.

I was raised in the remotest barrio I can imagine and consider that was circa 1960s. I recall that a team of government workers would often surprise us with their house to house spraying of DDT because malaria was rampant in almost everywhere. That was the time when the forest and cogonal grassland were just nearby. My mother would ask from them a handful of DDT in exchange for a half-dozen eggs that were just taken from the corner. My father used this DDT to spray our tobacco farm because it was found out to be very effective against all kinds of insects, both harmful and useful. Nobody would tell us then that DDT was not ideal for such use because of its harmful effect even to humans when inhaled directly.

Our house was just a box-type enclosure of carefully woven coconut leaves from the walls to the roof and what could be a better flooring than Mother earth herself. I enjoyed running around and playing with children of my age in the neighborhood. Speaking of neighbors, the nearest house is more or less 300 meters away. And so if there were more than ten of us playmates, you would imagine that we came from places within a span of more or less 3 square kilometers.

It was not until 1970s that the Muslims of Mindanao learned to live in clusters in the barrios. We were just happy carefree children who run around without a slipper and most of the time in one piece clothing. At the end of the day, nobody would tell us to wash or clean ourselves before going to sleep. Such was simple living at its simplest. I never heard about toothbrush, toothpaste, bath soap, much more, perfume. All I know was that was the best part of the earth for me. What was simply innocence that time is already the worst form of ignorance to children of today. But I love my innocence. I beg to disagree if you would call that ignorance. Anyway, I know everything that comes to my senses that time. The only thing I cannot imagine was going to school because I have no knowledge of how far was the nearest school.

Then finally a primary school was opened in my barrio in 1960. Next to the Mosque, it was the most beautiful building made of woven bamboo slacks for its walls and galvanized iron for its roof. Inside were wooden benches attached to one another. When one of us is restlessly naughty, the whole group is affected. I recall that I was just barely qualified to enroll in grade one because I could hardly reach my left ear using my right hand extended over my head. (I found out many years later, using the same technique to my son, that it was a reliable way of determining a child’s schooling age). They say that I was the brightest pupil in grade one. By the middle of the year I was promoted to grade two because I can read with understanding the English textbook Pepe and Pilar. And so, I graduated from the primary school in only three years. Yes, there was a primary graduation that time.

After primary graduation, my parents enrolled me to the public central elementary school in the poblacion. For the first time, I saw the so-called outside civilization where houses were so close to one other. I have tasted a cold sweet tasting bottled liquid which they call lemonade. Everything was so new to me. I thought from the first day of class that I will be out of place as I imagined that most of them were brighter than me. By the end of the year, I was among the top five in class, modesty aside. I long to go home during weekends because I miss my playmates and the fresh barrio breeze. I had to hike about four kilometers from the last point where the jeep could bring us from the poblacion to reach our barrio. But I realize that I was luckier than my playmates for having enrolled further into the elementary grades.

Months and years passed and everything around me seems to be moving and changing fast. I was also learning fast to adapt to the so-called civilization. When I was in first year high school in a private sectarian school I could enroll on my own. I don’t want my mother to go with me everytime I enroll. I wanted to prove to her that I was maturing fast to adolescence. And so I believe that I could already manage to do things on my own. I felt that I was already a young man even in my third year in high school. I had learned to feel ‘crush’ everytime I see my beautiful girl. I wanted to court her but I had a problem. I feared the moment that she would turn me down because I was a Moro. I also feared the day that my mother would know that I was courting a ‘kafir ’ (infidel, as they call a non-Muslim) because it was taboo that time. Until late 1960s, marriage between individuals of different religious affiliations was not tolerated by the Muslim culture in our place.

But I was seriously falling for my beautiful girl. And so I wanted to test the waters, so to speak. I wanted to find out her initial reactions. I gathered all the energy that I could muster but my knees would tremble and no words would come out of my mouth. This must be the real love at first sight! After several attempts, it was all the same. There was only one thing that I was progressing through in terms of level of confidence and that I was beginning to feel that the feeling was mutual. She would no longer turn down my invitations for snacks at the canteen. And so we were talking to each other on topics of mutual interest except ‘love’.

Finally, I said the words and expressed how much I love her and she turned around without saying anything. Until we went out of the refreshment parlor she refused to say a word and would not look at me. I must have offended her, so I thought. I don’t want to ask for forgiveness neither would I follow up what I said earlier. Maybe it was just good that I had expressed what I feel for her. Maybe time will decide in my favor. In school, she would try everything to avoid me. I wanted to look at her; she’s the apple of my eyes. I would try anything to corner her until I did finally cornered her. Without much ado, I asked for forgiveness and went back to my old trick to regain her confidence. Several months passed and I was steadfast at winning her heart. “There is no rocky hill to a man with an iron will”. These words from an old sage were all I need to keep me going.

True enough, time was on my side. In our fourth year in high school, it was different altogether. Did the summer vacation made us long for each other? May be so. At last, my diligence finally paid for me. Several weeks before graduation, I heard from her what I had always longed for - a verbal confirmation that the feeling of love was mutual. And so I heard the sweetest words: “yes, I love you too!” What a beautiful world it was for the two of us.

And then, it was graduation day. More than the apprehension that her parents and mine would know about our relationship, and the consequences that would follow, the fear of being separated from each other was a dreadful scenario I would not even dare to imagine. She knew that I could not continue to college and I knew that she would be studying in Manila.

The following day, immediately after graduation, I looked for her. I gathered all the guts I could muster to go to their house. That was the only place I would certainly find her. And so I went to their house and she met me at the gate. We agreed not to mention anything about our relationship so her parents would not sense anything. We were cracking jokes so we would feel happy and comfortable but the fear of being separated was enormous. What else can we do? Finally, we agreed to give each other small tokens that would keep us reminded of each other. We agreed to exchange white handkerchiefs.

In school white handkerchief was a must for every student. It was checked every morning during flag ceremony. We were together the whole day and really enjoyed each other’s company. As the sun was setting, she begged that I would dine with them in the house, which her mother duly seconded. I had already lunched with them and I felt that it was already too much to stay until dinnertime. And so I begged off to just go, saying, that I still had to go home to the barrio, even if I knew that it was no longer possible. The last jeep must have left at 5:00 p.m. We promised to write each other – something that I would deligently check at the Post Office on market days (Thursdays).

In the beginning, we used to exchange letters. She was doing good in her studies in Manila while I was back to my old ways in the barrio: playing with playmates, pasturing the work animals, gathering firewood and helping in our tobacco and corn farms.

Months and years passed and this time, I would no longer received letters from her. In short, our communication was cut. I deserved this, I sighed to myself. I was not going to school; there are boys in Manila who are certainly more good-looking (and good smelling too!); what will she get from me?

Then the armed conflict erupted in Central Mindanao in the early 1970s and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was actively recruiting young and able-bodied boys to join its armed forces. For six years, I had my stint with the MNLF, not because it was my choice, but because I had no choice. My barrio was a favorite battleground between the government and MNLF forces. In 1976 the Tripoli Agreement was signed between the government and the MNLF. For a time there was a lull in the fighting as the formal ceasefire agreement was implemented on the ground several months after.

I felt that this time was a golden opportunity for me to enroll in college but it was not until three years later that I was able to go to college. I asked for some money from my mother so I could finally enroll. She said that she didn’t have any but there was money being saved for the hospitalization of my younger sister. She was having on-and-off fever for several weeks already. I asked my younger sister if I could take two hundred pesos from her savings so I could go and enroll. As a younger sister, she acceded to my request.

I enrolled in the nearest state university where I could possibly be taken as a ‘grant-in-aid’ scholar, a special program of the University for poor and deserving students from the cultural minorities. Three days after, I went back home to see my sick sister. From a distance, as I was approaching the house, I saw an unusual number of people gathered. My God, my sister just died. Oh, I can’t forgive myself. That two hundred pesos I had taken from her savings; maybe that was the reason why she was not brought to the doctor; maybe, that was the reason why she died. I refuse to imagine anything; I felt that I was just slowly melting from where I stood. I entered the house and they were looking for a white piece of cloth. It was the practice to cover the dead person’s face with a white piece of cloth; I remembered the white handkerchief. Oh, what small thing I can do but I was willing to do anything for my sister.

After the seventh day of my sister’s wake, I went back to school. I took up a five-year engineering course. I never imagined anything that would come my way, no matter how hard it was. I only knew that I have to graduate someday. Believe it or not, there were times that I was skipping meals but I don’t want to get affected. “There is no rocky hill to a man with an iron will!”. Finally, after five years, I graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Agricultural Engineering.

This time, I was not thinking seriously about my ‘beautiful girl’ anymore. I still had the white handkerchief with me, though, it was no longer the usual white that it was before. In the year 2000, the first grand alumni homecoming in the high school where we graduated from was held. The first person I was expecting to see was my ‘beautiful girl’, my high school sweetheart. I really came earlier to check on everyone arriving to make sure that I would not miss her. The thrill of seeing each other after a long, long time is still there but this time it was more for curiosity’s sake. I was already almost twenty years married at this time and I was sure that she must have married also.

Many had already arrived but she was not one of them. Not being able to hold anymore, I asked our classmates. One of them said, “you still did not know that Erlinda died of leukemia a few years back?” “My God, everything in this world will certainly have its own ending,” I murmured. But why should death occur even at the wrong time. My hands slowly drifted inside my pocket to reach out for the white handkerchief. It was already having some stain but to me it was still so white as in the intention that was associated with it was so pure.

For the second time, I felt that I was melting down but I managed to keep my calm. I was unanimously chosen as the Guest Speaker from our batch. I was the next speaker and so I had to keep my composure. After my speech my classmates told me that my speech was so passionate and eloquently personal. Believe it or not, you have just read the rehash of my speech. I would love to tell everyone my real-life experience because to me it was so powerfully inspiring to people who are about to lost hope in everything they had wished for. Not in the case of someone with an iron will and enduring faith in God.

Several months later, I was called up by my brother and told me that our mother was sick. This time, I was already head of a government office. Having little extra resources, I lost not time fetching my mother. I don’t want her to miss the doctor due to my imprudence. On the way, my brother had reminded me several times that I was driving fast. We reached the hospital in due time and I was informed by the doctor that she has hypertension. There was no cause for alarm for as long as medication is maintained. I asked the doctor if we could continue the medication at home. I had a niece who just graduated from a nursing course. I asked her to delay her plan of going abroad so she could keep watch of my mother as all the children were going to school and my wife and I are working with the government. After two months, my niece finally went to work abroad as my mother was already doing well. It was then that I traveled often as required by my job.

One evening, after arriving from Cebu City, my mother requested that we have dinner together. I acceded to her request. After eating, I told her to go to sleep ahead of me as I would be watching TV. She politely acceded. After a few minutes she complained of an intense abdominal pain. I took her to my lap. She stared at me as if she was laboring hard. After few minutes, she had one final look at me as if saying, “probably, this is my last breath”. Indeed, it was. My God, how can I believe that my mother would die when she was declared fine by the doctor. As I felt like I was melting down again, I had only fervently prayed in silence. “My Lord, at last I had one final noble use for the white handkerchief; but this time, it shall rest with my mother; I had enough of its memories; please take care of all the people I have loved and whose memories were directly associated with the white handkerchief, amen.”

Some Options to Overcome the Impasse

On the stalled GRP-MILF negotiation:

SOME OPTIONS TO OVERCOME THE IMPASSE

Maugan Buat Mosaid, Ph.D.


Brief Background

After the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) signed the Final Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on September 2, 1996, the next best and most logical thing to do is to negotiate peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). With following and military capabilities more or less equal that of the MNLF, the GRP may have realized that its task of peace-building is never complete if there remains of the Bangsamoro a restless force that has not come to settle peace with the government.

And so on August 3, 1996 Executive Secretary Ruben Torres met MILF Vice Chairman for Political Affairs Ghadzali Jaafar in Davao and relayed the government’s desire to enter into formal negotiations with the MILF. This was followed by the meeting of the GRP and MILF Technical Committees on January 7, 1997 which marked the start of formal negotiations between the two parties. Subsequent meetings, mostly at the technical level, followed.

The MILF originally proposed nine talking points which were later clustered into six talking points. When the GRP and MILF panels met in Tripoli, Libya in June 2001, this was fine-tuned to three aspects that served as the main agenda for the peace talks. These are: 1) Security, 2) Rehabilitation and Development, and 3) Ancestral Domain. This resulted to the signing of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. Thus, the MILF had its own version of the Tripoli Agreement. If the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 served as the framework for the government’s negotiation with the MNLF, the Tripoli Agreement of 2001 served the purpose for the MILF.

The agendum on ancestral domain was further subdivided into four strands, namely: 1) General Concepts, 2) Territory, 3) Natural Resources, and 4) Governance. These four strands were discussed during the 7th exploratory talks (April 2005) and 8rh exploratory talks (September 2005) and the consensus therein shall become the framework within which both panels would be crafting the memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain.

Other Frameworks for the Negotiation

There was clear understanding between the two parties with respect to the Tripoli Agreement of 2001 but occasional misunderstandings occur when references were made on some other frameworks for the negotiation. On one hand, the GRP Panel made it a point that it negotiates on the bases of the Philippine Constitution and territorial integrity of the country. Therefore, any agreement shall pass through the usual constitutional processes and any realignment of territorial boundaries shall have to pass through a plebiscite. On the other hand, the MILF Panel insists that its claim for a Bangsamoro homeland was based on an established right to ancestral domain recognized by the Philippine constitution and quest for self-rule based on an established right to self-determination recognized under international law and a duly recognized instrument for peace by no less than the United Nations. In addition, the MILF panel insists that the government shall take into consideration some historical realities related to the Bangsamoro issues on ancestral domain and self-determination.

The following are some concepts and principles on self-determination under international law and practice (as cited by Atty. Musib M. Buat, member of the MILF Panel):

“Self-determination is not a destabilizing concept. Self-determination and democracy go hand in hand, if democracy means the rule of the people, by the people, then the people of self-determination assures that no one people may rule another – and here lies its enduring appeal” (Nadesa Satyendra, 1998);

“The right of peoples to self-determination exists as such in modern international law, with all the consequences that flow therefrom” (Hector Gross Espiell, 1980);

“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By the virtues of that right they determine the political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development” (Article 1.1: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966).

Breakdown of Negotiation

The first major breakdown in the negotiation was on June 1, 2000. Before this, on April 27, 2000, the GRP and MILF panels met in Cotabato City to discuss ways on how to diffuse the tensions brought about by armed encounters between government and MILF forces which started in the Lanao provinces. However, at dawn of the following day the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) attacked Camp Abubakar, the main camp of the MILF. Thus begun the all-out war enunciated by the Estrada administration against the MILF.

The second major impasse was during the 13th Exploratory Talks in September 2006 when both panels could not agree on the delineation and delimitation of territories that shall comprise the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) – the more technical term for a Bangsamoro Homeland. The GRP panel would consider more or less 600 Muslim-dominated villages outside the ARMM while the MILF panel would insist for more than a thousand. These areas are over and above the present areas covered by the ARMM. The other contentious issue was the definition of contiguity.

The third major breakdown in the talks happened on December 15, 2007. Both panels were already in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia for the supposed 15th Exploratory Talks to fine-tune the consensus points on Ancestral Domain. There was no major debate expected as most of the consensus points were already settled during the 14th Exploratory Talks. All was set for the panels to initial the draft MOA which was calendared for formal signing when the talks resume in January 2008. Then, the MILF panel learned that the GRP panel had inserted in its draft of the Memorandum of Agreement the phrase “in accordance with constitutional processes”. This was vehemently opposed by the MILF panel as this was an insertion – an adulteration of the original draft of the MOA. Not being able to cleanse its copy of the draft MOA, the MILF panel decided that it is no longer feasible to face the other party in the negotiating table. Thus, the talks bumped into another impasse.

How Previous Snags in the Talks were Resolved

The circumstances, as well as the personalities and institutions involved, in the resumption of the talks are important as they give us significant lessons in the peace process. In a way, they serve to guide future actions that will have to be undertaken to put the negotiation back on track. While each particular situation may require distinct creative ways and adept means at a given time, the fundamentals of handling them remain the same.

The first parting of ways in the negotiation was caused by the government’s violation of the ceasefire agreement. Apparently, the government’s armed forces did not give much credence to its peace panel when, despite some consensus reached to diffuse the tension brought about by the armed confrontation that started in the Lanao provinces, it proceeded to attack Camp Abubakar at dawn of June 2, 2000. Immediately, thereafter, the MILF disbanded its panel and withdrew from the talks.

When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the Presidency in 2001, she sought the assistance of Prime Minister Mahathir to convince the MILF to go back to the negotiation table. After a series of trips by the Malaysian emissaries to the Islamic Center in Camp Rajahmuda, MILF Chair Hashim Salamat agreed to resume talks with the government.

The second impasse was primarily caused by some technicalities in the matter of interpretation of delineation and delimitation of areas that will comprise the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity including some ambiguity on the definition of contiguity.

This time (2004), the coming in of a third party (country) monitoring team composed of representatives from Malaysia, Brunei and Libya was an added dimension. The ‘back-channeling’ efforts from both parties to revive the negotiation was minimized as this was replaced by the so-called ‘shuttle diplomacy’ employed by Malaysia, in particular, as a creative means of convincing the parties to go back to the negotiating table. After a series of shuttling down to Manila and Camp Darapanan, the Parties agreed to attend the 14th Exploratory Talks in November 2007. That proved to be very fruitful as some 29 consensus points, mostly on ancestral domain, were settled.

Then, the 15th Exploratory Talks was set December 15-17 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF panel was in high spirits as it was more of a formality like initialing the draft MOA than talking because everything on ancestral domain had been settled during the previous exploratory talk. Then the MILF panel learned that the GRP panel’s copy of the draft MOA contained the phrase “in accordance with constitutional processes” which it vehemently objected to the point that it did not enter the negotiating room when the GRP panel failed to cleanse its copy. And so the talks bumped into another impasse.

This time the breakdown in negotiation was the making of the GRP panel as obviously influenced by the so-called ‘spoilers’ of the talks. These are people, alleged by the MILF, as well-entrenched in power and having strong influence in national policy and decision-making. They are also thought to be people of the cabinet cluster “E” or the national security cluster.

The Bone of Contentions

First, let us examine the obstructing mechanisms both legal, traditional, historical and behavioral on the part of both parties. Then let us fit them against the facilitating mechanisms in the same aspects and see if some adjustments are possible without causing major shifts in terms of positions or positioning espoused by both parties.

The MILF insisted that the claim for a ‘Bangsamoro Homeland’ is based on an established right to ancestral domain as well as the claim for ‘self-rule’ based on an established right to self-determination. However, some people in government commented that the MILF’s claim for ancestral domain based on some historical antecedents is no longer plausible or logical. So, the first bone of contention, it seems, is the relevance of historical antecedents to the claim for ancestral domain. In our view, the issue of historical relevance would not have been an issue at all because the Philippine Constitution of 1987 recognizes ancestral domain as one of the bases for recognizing minority rights in the Philippines. On this basis alone, the Bangsamoro claim for ancestral domain can be accommodated under the Philippine Constitution in much the same way as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) passed by Congress was anchored on the same principle.

The Philippine Constitution of 1987 recognizes the right of self determination (Art. II, section 7, on State Policies) but unfortunately it has its limiting mechanisms such as the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. One of the justifications for the Philippine’s claim of territorial integrity, with particular reference to historic rights under the 1935 Constitution, was the foreign treaties entered into by the Moro suzerains.

The same Constitution under Article II, Section 1 on Declaration of Principles “…adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, unity with all nations.” This is another restricted principle under the Philippine constitution. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, treaties entered into by the Philippines have the same category as domestic laws and as such like any legislation enacted by Congress, these treaties could be amended. This interpretation runs counter to the principle of pacta sunt servanda whereby the state parties are duty bound to honor their treaty obligations under treaties entered into. Thus, the Supreme Court, in the Bayan case when the constitutionality of the VFA was raised, sustained the principle of pacta sunt servanda under international law. This was the reason why the MILF Peace Panel during the resumption of he peace talks in Tripoli, Libya registered its objection to use the Philippine constitution as the framework of negotiation. The MILF Panel preferred the adherence by the Parties on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the internationally recognized Human Rights instruments in defining the relations between the Philippine Government and the Bangsamoro people with respect, among others, to their fundamental right to determine their future political status, which specifically refers to the right to self-determination (Atty. Musib M. Buat, 2007: Right to Self Determination).

As early as April 2005, the Government of Republic of the Philippines (GRP) through its peace panel, has offered the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) a federal state but the latter rejected it, saying the government is not in a position to offer much less grant it. The offer was contained in a document submitted to the MILF peace panel during the 7th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks in Guoman, Port Dickson, Selangor, Malaysia.

However, the MILF’s rejection of the offer of a federal state should be put to context. The MILF viewed this as a ‘trick’. Knowing the propensity of the GRP panel to invoke the constitution whenever confronted with issues of constitutional concerns, how can the government grant something that is non-existent in the constitution? It means that the offer is only as good as when the constitution is amended and the form of government changed. Otherwise, this is tantamount to having made no offer at all. With the present Senate, any proposal to amend the constitution is next to impossible; at least, not before 2010. Must we wait after 2010 for the talks to resume? While this is possible, the danger of prolonged negotiation is the so-called ‘negotiation fatigue’.

From the looks of it, the MILF would stand pat on its position to pursue the so-called Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) with all presently-Muslim-dominated villages in Mindanao to compose it and have it governed by the shariah. Defining the extent of the BJE, although already a contentious issue, would not be as complicated as implementing the shariah en toto in this part of the country. Physical mutilation, under the shariah, is allowed as a form of punishment but same is not allowed under the Philippine Constitution. This was the reason why the so-called shariah being implemented under Presidential Decree No. 1086 was only limited in its application to Muslim personal laws (civil law) such as family relations, inheritance and succession.

Is there a Way to Meet Half-Way?

Maybe there is, maybe none. It all depends on the two sides whether they agree to a solution. Maybe the first option is to meet half-way or examine the primary agenda in the negotiation if it is possible to make some adjustments to meet half-way. By this, we mean that both parties are willing to drop some to gain some. For example, the primary reason why negotiation between the GRP and the MILF was made possible was because the GRP offered not to use the Philippine constitution as the benchmark for the negotiation which the MILF reciprocated by dropping the issue of independence as one of the subjects for negotiation.

The primary issue has been whether or not the GRP would allow some extra-constitutional means to address the issues surrounding the negotiation. Whether this is settled or not, there is still a way out so that negotiations don’t get stuck to where it has bunged. For example, determining the extent of the territorial boundary of the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) should not be a problem because it was already clear that only presently-Muslim-dominated villages would be absorbed into the BJE. If we are to assume that no Bangsamoro is opposed to the MILF-sponsored idea of creating the BJE, then a plebiscite or referendum becomes moot and academic.

Second, if we take recent pronouncements from the GRP and the MILF, there seems to be some reasons to be optimistic for the talks to resume. Muhammad Ameen, chairperson of the MILF Central Committee Secretariat, stressed the need to correct false impression or accusation that the MILF does not want the government to undertake constitutional processes to implement any peace deal with the MILF. He said “the government can undertake all constitutional processes it wants, provided [it does] not derogate what the Parties have jointly ‘crafted, agreed and signed’ in the negotiations. He stressed further that what the MILF cannot agree to is that it takes part in those constitutional processes, citing six reasons for it:

1. All negotiations to resolve sovereignty-based conflicts all over the world such as those in Kosovo , Ireland , Bougainville, Aceh , Sudan , Western Sahara , and many others are extra-constitutional in character. The one with the MILF is not an exception;

2. The MILF is a revolutionary organization, or in plain words, a rebel, which necessarily does not recognize the Philippine Constitution; otherwise, to do so would be tantamount to agreeing to become and [be] considered “criminals”;

3. The Philippine Constitution represents the interests of the majority, who are Christians, short-changing or undermining that of the Moros and other indigenous tribes. The Constitution always favors the greatest majority, because they were the framers, interpreters, and implementers;

4. To allow itself to be bound by constitutional process, aside from the foregoing reasons, the MILF virtually allows itself at the tyranny of the Philippine Government in [the] matter of interpretation and implementation of any peace deal;

5. The MILF will not and will never repeat the blunders committed by the MNLF and Chairman Nur Misuari of negotiating within the framework of the Philippine Constitution. After more than ten years since the signing of the GRP-MNLF Final Agreement in 1996, the MNLF and Nur Misuari are back to square one as far as the genuine resolution of the Moro Problem is concerned. Instead of giving genuine self-governance to the Bangsamoro People, they are being integrated into the national body politic, reminiscent of the government approach in the 50s and 60s; and

Today, there are enough models of resolving sovereignty-based conflicts which the government and the MILF can study and possibly adopt any of the appropriate model to the satisfaction of the Parties and other stake-holders. The international community must play an active role in this undertaking.

Third, the issue of whether or not the MILF gained some semblance of ‘status of belligerency’ keeps coming back. The mere fact that the GRP had initiated a formal negotiation between the Philippine state and the MILF is an affirmation of this reality. Negotiation of this breadth and specter necessitates that there must be at least two parties of equal footing facing each other on the negotiating table. While recognizing a status of belligerency for the MILF, the Philippine government can maintain that the issues or problems are internal in nature and sovereign in character. When the MILF agreed to drop the issue of independence, the territorial integrity of the country was already assured.
Fourth, the GRP, in initiating the formal negotiation, has already set aside the Philippine constitution as benchmark for the negotiation which the MILF reciprocated by dropping independence as one of the subjects of the talks. The ball is clearly in the hands of the GRP panel. The moment it goes back to re-assume its original position, negotiation can proceed anytime.

Fifth, apparently what is lacking in this case is a strong political will on the part of government and principled negotiation from both sides. What is obvious is a case of lackadaisical attitude on the part of government and maybe occasional enthusiasm that only shows every-time there is an impasse. On the part of the MILF, some extra effort to stretch its patience will help. For example, while the GRP panel’s copy of the draft MOA on ancestral domain was adulterated by a proposal to subject it to ‘constitutional process’, the MILF panel could have tried to do some bargaining efforts as in ‘hit and miss’ kind of thing. Having tried would have mattered more than not having tried at all.

Lastly, it might help to reconstitute the membership of the GRP panel. Secretary Eduardo Ermita was not able to bring the GRP-MNLF negotiation to a conclusion. It was Ambassador Manuel Yan who had successfully brought the negotiation to a close. This time, some quarters are beginning to doubt Secretary Rodolfo Garcia’s ability to steer the GRP-MILF talks to its conclusive phase.

What made the difference, if any, among these people? Well, all of them were former military men, except that Manuel Yan was a military-man-turned-diplomat. Diplomats have greater advantage in the art of negotiating than military men who had not experienced the art of diplomacy. If we are to take this notion, then Ambassador Roy Cimatu makes a good replacement for Secretary Rodolfo Garcia. Also, instead of Secretary Nasser Pangandaman, somebody else, a prominent lawyer who would, in a way, represent the ARMM, shall be allowed to replace him. The MILF might, also, consider reconstituting its panel of negotiators. While it may be argued that the negotiators are not the problem, bringing in some fresh minds into the negotiation may help as some of the old buddies may have already been experiencing negotiation fatigue.

Presently, the government Peace Panel is composed of Secretary Rodolfo Garcia (ret. Gen.), Prof. Rudy Rodil, Atty. Leah Armamento, Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria, Sylvia Paraguya, Secretary Nasser Pangandaman and Ryan Mark Sullivan.

On the MILF side are Mohagher Iqbal, Atty. Lanang Ali, Atty. Michael Mastura, Atty. Musib Buat, Maulana Alonto, and Abdulla Camlian, head of the MILF Technical Committee. Also with the group are Mike Pasigan, Amor Pendaliday, and Mohajirin Ali.
For principled negotiation and determined negotiators, any conceivable means is worth trying and all possible options are worth considering, if only to make it proceed. The talks, for whatever level it has reached, has already achieved so much that nobody could imagine such gains would go to naught because nobody tried enough to salvage it from vanishing into, probably, oblivion.

High Hopes for Year of the Rat

Maugan Buat Mosaid, Ph.D.

Again, the New Year tradition of predictions and fortune-telling comes to the fore as people expect some changes for the better in their lives and career. Some express them in the form of new year resolutions which are mostly stern promises of leaving bad habits behind with the outgoing year . Others want to be guided by the more conventional art of knowing the things and events that are yet to come, i.e. through feng shui, astrology, tarot cards, etc. (I would still refer to these media of predicting the future as more of an ‘art’ than scientific as there is yet no means for an empirical inquiry to prove them through and through). Still others, the more pious ones, resort to prayers as it is still the best means to shape up the future the way it should be through Divine intercession.

Equally fascinating and worth mentioning are the thoughts posted by two unassuming intellectuals who hid their identities under the following: Toyskie: “More interesting than predictions for 2008 is the list of predictions for 2007 that came true and another list for those that did not. I wonder which list is longer. Perhaps another little research on feng shui’s batting average is called for at this time.” And Maxim: “Feng shui, astrology, tarot cards, etc. have become interesting media for predictions, though I consider them as more of an art than scientific. As an art it has drawn many enthusiasts and adherents for the intrinsic means by which it is undertaken and for the value attached to it. For its unique system, procedures and technique, the art of prediction or fortune-telling has even develop its own culture that not too many have mastered. Interestingly, it is appreciated more for its ‘hits’ than its ‘misses’. So, regardless of which list is longer, the art will continue to grow in popularity and may even generate more downstream opportunities.”

On the national scene, the following are some of the scenarios foretold by the ‘experts’ in the aspect of predicting/fortune-telling:

On the economy:

1. The economy will be stable; good businesses are food, travel agency, electronics, construction and real estate;
2. The year 2008 will be good for those born in the year of the rat, tiger, dragon and snake;
3. It is good to set out under the sun as it gives so much positive energy for the year 2008;

On politics:

1. There will be a coup for the Senate leadership;
2. Threats for GMA continue but will finish her term until 2010;
3. Women leaders shall be perceived to be powerful and strong;
4. Erap shall continue to be popular among the masses;
5. Noli de Castro will just do some balancing acts to continue to play second fiddle to GMA;
6. Trillanes will continue to be restless and remain a problem of the Arroyo administration;

Sex scandal:

1. One Senator will be involved in a sex scandal;
2. Homosexual relationships will be problematic;

Accidents:

1. Accidents due to landslides will be more this year; some few accidents in water and air transportations will also happen;
2. Traffic accidents due to hotheads will be more in 2008 than past years;

On sports:

1. The year 2008 may not be too good for Manny Pacquiao in terms of his boxing career;
2. Other Filipino boxers, including new ones, will continue to have good boxing career for 2008.

However, on the other side of the euphora for brighter things to come, is the fact that not one of the corrupt, oppressors, and violators of human rights (and minority rights) has come to the fore to say their piece for the new year , which means, that the oppressed has nothing much to expect about in the year 2008. These people, whose fate rests in the hands of the few rich and powerful, are not in a position to try to shape up the future or improve their lot.

There is no need to mention a lot of them but the more prominent ones are: 1) the case of the Sumilao farmers in Bukidnon, who marched to Manila from mid-October 2007 and arrived in early December, or more or less two months of hiking to dramatize their claim to a portion of the 400-hectare farm estate formerly owned by the prominent Quisumbing family but sold to the more powerful San Miguel Corporation; and 2) the case of the Bangsamoro people who are claiming a small portion of Mindanao (once dominated by them) under an established right for ancestral domain which they can call ‘homeland’. Their other wish is that this ‘homeland’ shall be govern by an indigenous system called Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) under an established right to self-determination and self-actualization.

The Bangsamoro people have more than dramatize their cause in terms of lives lost and properties damaged when they decided to claim these rights through armed struggle. Now they are anchoring hopes on peaceful means, i.e. the on-going negotiations between the GRP and the MILF but nothing seems to be certain yet as of now.

What is certain is that the GRP-MILF Talk has bumped into another impasse as the GRP panel allegedly reneged in its commitment in the peace process by inserting the phrase: “in accordance with constitutional processes” in its copy of the draft Memorandum of Agreement. This was vehemently opposed by the MILF panel. And when the GRP panel failed to cleanse its copy of the MOA, the MILF panel decided that it is no longer feasible to face the other party in the negotiating table. This was supposed to be the 15th exploratory talks had it pushed through in Kuala Lumpur last December 15-17, 2007.

Thus said, the oppressed Bangsamoro people cannot wish for something better in the New Year or probably in the entire duration of 2008. But the ball is still in the hands of the GRP panel. If it has the political will to return to the unadulterated original draft of the MOA, the MILF panel is more than willing to go back to the negotiating table.

For our part, the lowly Bangsamoro masses, we can only wish that people high up in government, who ‘call the shots’, shall be Divinely inspired to see the wisdom of continuing on with the peace talks. If and when they see the ‘light’, there is still chance for a happy new year, so to speak.

Any agreement between the two parties will not directly bring food to the lowly Bangsamoro’s dining table, but, seeing the talks proceeding through unhampered is enough reason to be happy for the new year because that would mean that peace is still certain even if it does not come too soon.

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Comments
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Maxim, thru email: 01/01/2008; 8:48pm

I do not know when will the GRP stops 'babying' the MILF. Now that the talks has bumped into another impasse Secretary Ermita is istill upbeat at offering a federal state or transforming the present ARMM to a federal state. Did he forget that the same offer was made by the government to the MILF in 2005 and was rejected?

Knowing the propensity of the GRP Panel at using the constitution as convenient shield when confronted with 'unconstitutional' proposals from the MILF, there is more reason to reject a federal state which is non-existent in the constitution.

When will Malacanang begin to appreciate that the Bangsamoro dream is claim for a 'homeland' based on an established right to ancestral domain, and claim for self-rule based on an established right to self-determination?

The offer, it seems, is just another one of a sinister plan to insist on something that the MILF will certainly reject, to make it appear that it is the MILF that is hard to please, albeit, goverment's offer to settle peace.

We reiterate that the clamor of the Bangsamoro is not difficult to understand, rather, it is the goverment's discernible circus acts that is complicating the peace process.

The ARMM: at the Crossroads in the Peace Process

Maugan Buat Mosaid, Ph.D.

Has anyone pondered on why there was no official representation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as an organic entity in Philippine geo-political structure and the most affected, in the negotiations for peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Bangsamoro fronts? Was it assumed to have been taken cared of by the members of the GRP panel? Or, is this necessary at all?

As a juridical entity, having distinct personality and life of its own, the ARMM must assume position in the negotiations for peace, and therefore, it deserves a seat in the GRP Peace Panel. The ARMM is being run by more than 10,000 strong personnel and their well-being must be considered in the ‘talks’ through their legitimate representative. Such well-being cannot just be resigned to fate or be decided upon with impunity by any of the parties.

The invitation for ARMM Regional Gov. Datu Zaldy Puti U. Ampatuan to participate in the review of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in November 2007 underscored the importance of ARMM’s visible role in the peace process. This role for ARMM should have been engaged at the start of negotiations. The ARMM (and SPDA) was made part of the concessions for the MNLF yet it was not given the chance to speak up for itself. The Lumads, too, have been clamoring for substantial participation in the peace process.

Whatever the ARMM does produces ripples that affect the peace process. On the part of the Bangsamoro, they will always look at the ARMM as an important instrumentality of the government. When it shows only dismal performance, it becomes a good example of blame for the half-cooked autonomy that it has been. Likewise, the ARMM’s participation (or non-participation) in the peace process will be seen as a measure of how the GRP affords its regard (or disregard) of this autonomous government. Simply stated, the ARMM, for whatever it is (or has been) is the peace process being rendered in practicum in the Bangsamoro homeland, and therefore, its success or failure has so much bearing on the peace process.

It was awful to note how both parties seem to downplay the importance of ARMM’s participation in the peace process. The present leadership of the ARMM cannot be faulted for getting such trivial treatment. In his first and second SORA (state of the region address) Regional Governor Datu Zaldy U. Ampatuan expressed goodwill to support the peace process between the GRP and the Moro fronts – something too important to remain as lip-service.

What could be the reason for such superficial treatment?

On the side of the MILF, it may be due to the fact that it did not recognize the ARMM’s existence from the very beginning. It has never demanded for an autonomy like the ARMM nor was it a party to its creation. The irony is that it is difficult to distinguish the MILF’s constituents from ARMM’s constituents that it serves or has been serving for the past 17 years.

On the side of the GRP, it may be due to the fact that the President of the Philippines exercises authority and supervision over the ARMM, and therefore, there is reason to take for granted ARMM’s participation in the negotiation, or if ever necessary, this can be articulated by the members of the GRP panel. That, of course, is hypothetical. Be that as it may, it is not always right to assume that a mother can always speak up for her daughter even if she knows her too well.

The prospect of signing a GRP-MILF agreement on ancestral domain looms and the ARMM, over and above other Muslim-dominated villages that may be included in the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), is part and parcel of the coming agreement. As to how the Muslim-dominated villages (outside ARMM) and the present ARMM would be merged, given the present organic act (RA 9054) and the 1996 Peace Accord, is not yet clear. What is clear is that the ARMM is in the pipeline for a possible concession to another party, the MILF. And (again) it has to concede in silence.

How would this be reconciled with the 1996 Final Peace Agreement? While it is always possible to pass another organic act to amend RA 9054 it is not prudent to pass a law amending the 1996 Final Peace Agreement at a time when the MNLF (the first concessionaire of the ARMM) is clamoring for more substantial implementation of the 1996 Accord. The other point is that the ‘Agreement’ was a product of bilateral efforts between two parties while a law can be a solitary act of Congress, and therefore, a law amending a bilateral agreement is ridiculous and absurd.

But why was the first concessionaire of the ARMM seems to be booted out of its supposed political turf when, as agreed, the passing of an organic act expanding the area of coverage of the ARMM would take care of Phase 2 of the Agreement?

The reality is that RA 9054 has to operate, inclusive of whatever shortcomings it has, as the MNLF would admit later. The qualification for Regional Governorship and Vice Governorship of the ARMM is very basic: among others, one does not have to be an organic member of the MNLF to be eligible to run for these positions. Was this overlooked if the spirit and intent of expanding the ARMM was to give way for the MNLF, as a concessionaire, to exercise and express some semblance of political right over the ARMM? Maybe not, but because the MNLF’s participation in the crafting of RA 9054 was only limited to a certain extent, then Congress, where the tyranny of numbers sometimes prevail, did not have much time to peep deeper into that ‘hole’. If the ARMM, that time under the stewardship of MNLF Chairman and Gov. Misuari, did more than enough to lobby for critical concerns that will have to be incorporated into the law, RA 9054 may be a little bit different or slightly better from the point of view of the MNLF.

The MNLF could not be caught up in the process with its pants down because there was enough time to lobby and Nur Misuari’s joining the government was a priceless break for Pres. Ramos at that time. In other words, there was good opportunity for the MNLF to do what would have been done to shape up RA 9054 the way it should be. In fact, the scheduled elections for the ARMM at the end of the term of Regional Governor Misuari in 2001 have been postponed twice to make sure that the amendatory law comes out in the incumbency of Chairman Misuari. Until the holding of the plebiscite for RA 9054 in August of 2001, the MNLF was silent on the law or nothing much was said against it.

Then the election for the ARMM came in November 2001 and the erstwhile Foreign Relations Minister of the MNLF, Dr. Farouk Hussin, was elected Regional Governor. When the Hussin administration was lurking in power under RA 9054, it was only all praises for the law. Matter of fact, his preface in the reproduced copy of RA 9054 was an all-out expression of gratitude and high expectations for what the law can do for the constituents of ARMM. But upon exit of the Hussin administration (in the later part of 2005), the MNLF began to sound off disgusts and came out with the opinion that RA 9054 did, in fact, violated the 1996 peace accord. RA 9054, the MNLF retorted, was not the answer to Phase 2 of the Agreement.

What about the on-going peace process with the MILF? The MILF hopes to be different in some respects. With so much to learn from the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement, it is in a better position to sign a ‘superior’ agreement. Mr. Mohagher Iqbal, Chair of the MILF Peace Panel, stressed the following points: “If the MILF enters into a peace agreement with the Philippine government, there will be three major points where we differ [from the MNLF]:”

“Difference in approach: Under the MNLF peace agreement, Misuari gave so much emphasis to foreign participation, i.e. the involvement of the OIC. In our case, though we welcome the OIC and other Muslim states, we can pursue peace talks on our own because we emphasize internal factors.”

“Different political approach, especially on the question of territory. MNLF asked for 14 provinces and 10 cities. [The] MILF does not give so much emphasis on autonomy. It seeks to establish an independent Islamic Government in areas where Muslims are predominant.”

“On plans to develop and uplift the living conditions of the Muslims: [In the case of the MNLF] projects for the development of Muslims, Highlanders and Christians were conceptualized only after the signing of the [final peace] agreement. Under the MILF, we are already involving them with some livelihood and development projects in order to uplift their living conditions even before we have entered into an agreement with the GRP. This is because we give more importance to self-reliance, to internal factors rather than external ones, especially aid.”

The MILF has a more conservative approach in the peace negotiation than the MNLF. While the GRP’s integrative approach was accepted by the MNLF, the same strategy may not work with the MILF. The MILF position that it negotiates within the framework of self-determination and historical realities seems non-negotiable. Though it welcomes the participation of the OIC and some Muslim States, the MILF is cautious at being persuaded to soften its stand on fundamental issues.

On the other hand, the GRP Peace Panel has been consistent in its stand: First, it cannot negotiate outside the framework of the Philippine Constitution, for if it does, it ceases to be a legitimate representative of the Philippine government. Second, any realignment of geo-political territorial boundaries shall have to be sanctioned by Congress and pass a plebiscite. We know that these are distasteful to the MILF.

We have seen how occasional impasse in the negotiation occurs and this happens when two parties have seemingly irreconcilable frameworks for the negotiation. Despite all these, it was interesting to note that the peace process has been progressing through. Though painstakingly slow, it is enough that both parties talk and do not cease at finding creative ways and adept means to resolve the issues. This time, the agility of both parties shall be put to test again as both camps turn their backs against each other at the resumption of talks in Malaysia in December 2007 due to the GRP Panel’s insertion of the phrase ‘in accordance with constitutional processes’ in the draft Memorandum of Agreement. The GRP Panel believes that the proposed Bangsamoro juridical entity [or homeland] be subjected to a plebiscite which the MILF panel vehemently opposed. Thus, the talks bumped into another impasse! For how long will the talks stay in this situation? Nobody can tell.

Maybe there are a few people who must have sighed in relief and considered this a ‘break’ rather than an impasse. If ever, this can only come from people organic to the ARMM who would rather see and feel some sense of comfort at such a situation than see ARMM’s fate being decided upon with such impunity.

But for all we know, this lull maybe a blessing-in-disguise as this could be an opportunity to contemplate on whether or not to allow ARMM’s more concrete participation in the peace process. The ARMM already missed a good point in the crafting of RA 9054. It must not miss another good point this time around.

As it is, the ARMM is completely expressionless under situations of an ‘agreement’ and ‘disagreement’. It hangs in suspended animation anticipating the next scenarios that unfold before its very eyes and wish that the ‘new occupants of the house’ shall be kind to its lowly ‘residents’.

Before two contending powerful forces where there is no way out, one can only resign its outcome to fate. A law in Physics states: “When an irresistible force meets an immovable object, something has to give up”. When such a situation comes (and we pray it won’t), we hope it is not the ARMM that will have to give up all the modest treatment and respect that it deserves from both parties.


Comments

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Dear Max:

Salam my brother! No doubt you are still a good writer and keeping abreast of the situation. I thank you for sharing me your thoughts on fundamental major issues affecting Mindanao especially the on-going Peace Negotiations which is a must for us stakeholders in Mindanao. However please allow me to make my personal comments on the matter.

First: I think the ARMM in the past has always been considered the by-product of the negotiation, the MNLF always claiming to be the representative of the Bangsamoro people, and now the MILF, forgetting to the point of being oblivious to the fact that they are just wanting to represent us and we are their real principal, therefore, their authority is revocable by the principal if and when necessary;

Second: The crafting of R.A. 9054. Actually the procedure for lawmaking has been properly observed. Congress has to pass it as the implementing instrument for the 1996 FPA between the GRP and the MNLF. Said law is a much better law than RA 6734, the original Organic Act, because Congress sought to improve some of the weak points in the old law, and further it incorporated many provisions of the FPA, and consultations were done even down to the Provincial level, and lawyers who were representing the MNLF were around in several occasions. Maybe they were not able to get all that they wanted, but honestly it is a beautiful and powerful law if powers are properly exercised. Maybe we should ask ourselves: was it a question of the grant of power or the exercise of that power?

Third: Secretary Dureza has always considered ARMM as a major part of the implementing mechanism in the continuing implementation of the 1996 FPA, hence the ARMM Officials were invited to the Jeddah conference last Nov. 10 to 12, 2007. However, ARMM should take it upon itself to strive harder in the delivery of basic social services, so it will merit the attention that it so deserve, because you cannot demand respect, it should be earned.

I think we have covered a lot this time. Keep in touch. Thanks and Salam.


Atty. Nabil A. Tan
Undersecretary, OPAPP


Reply
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Sir:

Alaykomis Salam..

Thanks for the deep thoughts you accorded my article. I do not rebut the 3 points you expounded; they are very well said, and you were in a more vantage position than me when those events unfolded. True, the ARMM was a by-product of all these peace processes (from the RCC to the MNLF to the MILF), but I just feel that the ARMM, being a juridical entity that has now come of age, should be accorded some sense of responsibility to take action when its very existence is touched. The ‘heads’ of the house come and go but there are permanent ‘residents’ inside.

I agree that it (the ARMM) may have indeed lack assertiveness but I feel some sense of guilt if I continue to stay on the sideline and be just one among the passive majority who would rather confine themselves to their own 'comfort zones'. You are closer to the powers-that-be, and again, you are in a more vantage position to articulate things for 'others' when we feel that they cannot or lack the agility to do so.

You would recall when you asked me to write a speech that you had to deliver for a group of Rotarians (or Masons?) in Manila (in 2003). I mentioned, among others, that one of the inherent weaknesses in the GRP-MILF peace overtures was the absence of a third party (country) monitoring team. My Brother, somebody in the group must have listened so intently and found a way to bring our message across to the core of the decision-makers, and ergo, there is the IMT. And it is doing well.

Good luck Sir!

Brother MAX

Questions on the GRP-MNLF Accord of 1996

Maugan Buat Mosaid, Ph.D.

Eleven years after its signing, the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement of 1996 generated more questions than answers. Whatever happened to it now? Did it fail or was it designed to fail? Is it still in the process of implementation or has it reached a dead-end?

In the beginning many Bangsamoro pinned so much hope in the agreement as something that would improve their lives or at least the start of better things to come. No less than the OIC expressed so much optimism when it said: “The 1996 peace agreement is the just, comprehensive and lasting fulfillment of the Filipino Muslims’ quest for effective autonomy and meaningful self-determination under the Philippine Constitution.”

But after all these years, the Philippine government and the MNLF are consistently making two different versions of the status of implementation of the agreement. On one hand, the government says the provisions of the agreement have been substantially implemented in “letter and spirit”. On the other hand, the MNLF claims that the substantial provisions of the agreement had not been implemented which was the reason why the MNLF had insisted that the implementation be reviewed with the participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference. In November 2007 the review did take place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and per newspaper account, the outcome was the same: there were two different versions of the status of implementation of the agreement claimed by the two sides.

All along, the status of implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement bred some questions like the following:

Who is telling the truth?

Several studies and commentaries had been made to this effect to understand the real status of implementation of the agreement as well as its impact on the lives of people who were supposed to benefit out of such undertaking. Examples of these studies were those of the OIC, Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID), and Institute of Autonomous Governance (IAG).

These studies, though not categorical, all pointed to the failure in the implementation of the agreement in its “letter and spirit”. Some of the specific important provisions which were allegedly unimplemented are: non-implementation of the Regional Security Forces, meager financial resources allotted to the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (as if it was designed to fail), non-pursuance of the proposed mini-marshal plan for Muslim Mindanao, superficial accommodation of qualified Muslims in the cabinet or cabinet-ranked positions, dis-enfranchisement of the MNLF in the expanded ARMM (RA 9054). Where indeed lies the problem?

Is it the Failure of the GRP to Implement Important Provisions of the Agreement?

The government claims that after the signing of RA 9054 and the subsequent plebiscite, it has started its commitment to the agreement and after 10 years the implementation is as good as completed. In many instances that the GRP had to make its report of accomplishment, there was no mention of how to pursue the remaining unimplemented provisions of the agreement.

Or is it the Inability of the MNLF to Implement Effective Administration and Governance?

The government claims that the administration of the ARMM by the MNLF was characterized by absenteeism, neglect and some allegation of corruption and that Nur Misuari had been passive and did not exercise adequate responsibility to govern well. The government claimed further that the peace agreement was supposed “to build institutions for peace rather than personalities and so despite Nur Misuari the implementation must go on.” It is this perception that divided the MNLF and the eventual incarceration of its Chairman, Nur Misuari.

The MNLF would counter that it is the lack of power and non-implementation of important provisions of the agreement that renders it inutile.

Is it Inadequacy of Resources or Mismanagement of Resources?

The government says that from 1996 to 2000 the total amount of funds released for various programs and projects in the ARMM and the SPCPD has reached P67.7 billion. Though this might have been true the MNLF claimed that the greater bulk of these funds were regular national government assistance that had been earmarked for the ARMM even without the Agreement. There were only meager funds generated by the Peace Agreement if the tasks of re-integration, rebuilding and reconstruction were to be considered.

Is it the built-in weaknesses/defects in the Agreement itself?

That the agreement does not have built-in power to effect good governance and social change may not be good reasons why such concerns were not substantially pursued. After all, the peace pact does not implement itself but by adequate policy support, timely provision of resources, effective delivery mechanism, and above all, sincerity in the commitment that the peace agreement succeeds.

Is it Misinterpretation of the Agreement?

How was the mineral resources understood by the GRP and the MNLF? What about the so-called “Mini-Marshall Plan”, provisional government and security? Any differences in the interpretation of the agreement, if ever, shall be resolved in the light of the Philippine Constitution and existing laws (par 153, FPA) or shall be resolved by the tripartite committee and that any unilateral act is deemed illegal.

So, where did it go wrong? Is it partly or all of the above?

These are various schools of thought, perceptions, speculations in the light of what many sectors consider failure of the GRP-MNLF agreement to deliver what was expected of it in the beginning.

The MNLF-GRP peace accord is a very important document in more ways than one.
First, it is an agreement duly facilitated and witnessed by the international communities which is morally binding for both the MNLF and the government to enforce. There has never been an agreement of that stature in our immediate past history. It was considered by the OIC as a just, comprehensive and lasting fulfillment of the Filipino Muslims’ quest for effective autonomy and meaningful self-determination under the Philippine constitution.

Second, the same agreement could have been a source for peace in Mindanao. With all the splendor, fame and special attention given to it by the Ramos administration and the international donor institutions it was such a powerful document that could have made a difference in terms of drawing the MNLF combatants into the mainstream social and political milieu.

Third, it has become an acid test to the sincerity and political will of the government in waging peace in Mindanao. Apparently, it fell short of this expectation. Is the government interested only in signing agreements and not in peace?

Fourth, it is also a barometer whether an agreement becomes successful when it is confined to the ambit of the constitution, especially in a one nation state where the fate of the minority is at the mercy of the majority.

And fifth, it could have become a good term of reference for the next best thing to do, i.e. to negotiate with the MILF.

The MNLF, at least many of its members, strongly believes that had the agreement been fully implemented in its entirety, it could have spelled the difference in the lives of the Bangsamoro or at least that is what they thought. And that is not impossible.

The agreement may not be the end all solution to the centuries-old problems in the Bangsamoro homeland, but given adequate resources, power, determination and capacity, it can indeed make a difference and it may not have caused the internal conflict in the MNLF, the incarceration of its chairperson and the problems it all created.

A Food for thought

Studies show that the most critical years immediately after signing an agreement or end of conflict is the first 1-5 years. Many countries experienced recurrence of violence within this time when things are not properly handled. Debate within the rebel front happens but it is a part of re-integration and reconstruction.

This should not be fueled by government to divide the group. It happened in the MNLF case and there was strong suspicion that National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales had a hand in the division of the MNLF. During this time, the so-called 15-man Council was formed with the expectation that it will regenerate the diminishing integrity of its Chair Nur Misuari.

If the division was deliberately influenced by some personalities in government, it achieved its purpose in terms of sowing confusion within the MNLF ranks and discrediting its key leaders.

If the government had been sincere it could have taken extra step to refer the issues to the OIC to prevent what had happened. Had the tripartite committee met earlier, it could have been a different story.

Is there a way out?

The long overdue way is to talk; the tripartite meeting could have been convened much earlier. Unfortunately, it took years before the government realized the urgency of this move or only after the damage had been done. One thing is clear: the government has been only occasionally enthusiastic in the implementation of the agreement while all throughout it has been passive.

“There is no more use crying over spilled milk”, as the saying goes, but what happened to the MNLF-GRP agreement has already become a lesson learned. As wise people say, “it is unforgivable stupidity to get bitten by a snake twice in the same hole”.

Implications of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks

The MILF, in their peace talks with the government, has become extra cautious in striking a deal with the latter. In their view, this government has not learned the art of implementing agreements as shown by the GRP-MNLF agreement of 1996. The sincerity and political will of this government is at stake. This, in a way slowed down and made the process more difficult for the MILF and the GRP.

On the other hand, a successful implementation could have produced a positive impact on the GRP-MILF talks, on the lives of the people and on the over-all peace and security of the region. Successful implementation could have also won the sympathy of foreign countries like the OIC and the international development institutions to help provide necessary development assistance in various forms.

But, as of now, the government and the MNLF did not err in their prediction that “failure of implementation could lead to a continuing armed conflict which in the long run will debilitate the strength and resources of the nation”.

Some Ramifications of the GRP-MILF Peace Process

Maugan Buat Mosaid, Ph.D.

The GRP-MILF Peace Agreement, when it comes, should be something different. First, the GRP is not expected to renegotiate what was already ‘settled’ with the MNLF. Second, there is much to learn from the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement from inherent flaws in the document itself to weak implementing mechanisms.

The GRP missed the point that a satisfactory rating in the implementation of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement would be a good incentive for the next best thing to do - to negotiate with the MILF. Or, in fairness, this may have been at the back of the minds of people involved in the implementation of the agreement, but only the government was less sincere or less capable, or both, to fully implement all the provisions and requirements of the final peace agreement to a satisfactory level.

What was supposed to come out as a good term of reference for a GRP-MILF negotiation to follow through came out later as good examples to stay away from. But there is no use crying over spilled milk. At this point, it will suffice that the MILF may take cognizance of the following:

1) To be lured into signing an unfunded agreement

The MNLF had to practically mendicate for much needed funds while there was no congressional appropriation to implement the provisions of the Final Peace Agreement. Initially the President’s Social Fund, though meager, had to take care of everything to ‘start the ball rolling.’

It was untenable to think why the funding requirement could be overlooked when Congress has authority to pass ‘continuing appropriation’ that stays on until it is expended.

2) To have an ‘agreement’ that is marred by open-ended provisions

The GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement was marred by open-ended provisions which were all subjugated to the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution and the numbers game in Congress. Commenting on Sen. Miriam Santiago’s proposal to file a complaint against Trillanes’ fiasco at the Manila Peninsula, Sen. ‘Chiz’ Escudero said, “now they don’t have the numbers on their side; something that they had used effectively against us when I was with the lower house.” You can see how the truism of logic can be thwarted, sometimes, by the game of numbers in Congress.

The American Indians got better deals from the US government under some settlements negotiated and granted outside the dominions of Congress and the Federal Constitution. The American Indian Movement (AIM) became very prominent in the late 1950s until early 1960s due to repressive policies begun under the Eisenhower administration.

Apparently, the GRP is not ready to explore extra-Constitutional means and out-of-Congress settlements to address the so-called ‘Mindanao problem’. Instead, the GRP negotiators have effectively used the Constitution and Congress as defense mechanisms whenever it is confronted with ‘controversial’ counter-proposals from the MILF. This can be gleaned from the words of Sec. Silvestre Afable, former Chair of the GRP Panel; “What the MILF wants is not possible to negotiate under the present terms of reference of the GRP peace panel”.

3) The GRP uses ‘sweet and sour’ tactics in the negotiation

The GRP panel is in charge of the ‘sweet’ strategies while the AFP takes charge of the ‘sour’ tactics. Before 2004 and until the assumption of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), batch 2 last year, it has become a pattern that armed confrontations on the ground would always occur a few days before or after the scheduled talks.

The MILF should not show impatience when negotiation is stalled by some critical disagreements or by simple dilly-dallying of the GRP as if it wants an ‘agreement’ more than the government. This is not basketball where the team who is more aggressive to have it is more likely to win the game.

4) Fast-tracking the agreement

The next thing that the GRP impresses upon the MILF is to fast-track the ‘agreement’ because time is of the essence. This was what the GRP did to the MNLF when the negotiation was on the verge of collapsing. The fast-tracking was so fast that the MNLF was mesmerized into agreeing with an ‘agreement’ that was drafted overnight by some Malacaňang boys.

On the resumption of the talks in 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was very optimistic that a final agreement would be signed “soon”. The “soon” overshot two years without significant strides to look upon. As of May this year, three of the four issues on ancestral domain had been resolved. Only the question on territory remained but that proved to be the toughest to hurdle. While both Parties had agreed to the definition on ‘contiguity’ they had not settled on the number of Muslim-dominated villages that would finally comprise the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. The GRP panel would consider more than 600 while the MILF insisted on more than a thousand. This number is over and above the present area of the ARMM.

The issue on territory may have been hurdled if the Philippine government heeded the appeal of the Malaysian talks facilitator Othman Abdul Razak to have a stronger political will to come up with an offer that would satisfy the MILF. Apparently the GRP was not moved by the suggestion as it is not in a hurry to close the deal with the MILF.

What would be there to hurry on, on the part of government, except as an offensive gambit to do a repeat of the strategy used on the MNLF?

5) What about a legislated ‘Bangsamoro Homeland’?

Yes, it might help toying with the idea of a legislated ‘Bangsamoro Homeland’ before signing a final peace agreement to see how sincere and how far the GRP would go.

This is not a political bribe. Following the GRP panel’s consistent stand, any geo-political realignment of territorial boundaries shall have to be sanctioned by Congress.

If Israel can grant a ‘Palestinian Homeland’ amidst a deeply rooted conflict characterized by so much hate and killings, the Philippines, where Muslims and Christians are in talking terms and peaceful co-habitation, is in a better position to do so. Surely, it is not necessary to wait for a similar situation before the same settlement can be made possible.

And when the GRP does the same, there is no missing a good point the second time around – to finally put to rest the ‘Moro uprisings’ in Mindanao which the Spaniards and Americans were not able to contain when they once held political power and control over the Philippine Islands.
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(Cotabato City; December 2007; Email: maxim61156@yahoo.com)

Notes on the Foreign-Assisted Projects in the ARMM

By: Maugan B. Mosaid, Ph.D.

December 2004, University of Southern Mindanao

INTRODUCTION

Since the ARMM became operational in 1990, the common perception is that it has yet to make strides in terms of showing concrete proof of its existence especially in the aspects of alleviating poverty and improving the living conditions of people in the rural areas. At most, people say, it has only served as a good employment agency for thousands of people working in the bureaucracy as a consequence of several new regional offices devolved and organized.
The questions more often asked were: What was new with ARMM in terms of governance and delivery of basic services? Did ARMM, as a new geo-political subdivision of Philippine bureaucracy, improved upon them? Can we say now, after more than a decade, that the areas under ARMM are better than they were before? Of course, under any given set-up, with or without ARMM, there are always issues and problems that tend to persist. But for the doable ones, the ARMM is expected to show that they are better done with this new geo-political set-up. Otherwise, it will give credibility to the opinion that the areas under ARMM are better reverted to the administrative region where they once belong. This is also to quell the view that the ARMM did not make any difference after more than a decade of existence. In fairness, only a second close look at how governance and delivery of basic services are faring with respect to human, institutional and livelihood development could provide a more credible opinion on the performance of the ARMM.
The process of the national government’s devolution to the ARMM is far from over. In fact, almost every new administration would clamor for more government instrumentalities to be devolved to the ARMM. However, the essence of devolution is more often questioned or set aside. Sec. Boncodin of the DBM cautioned that ARMM does not have to copy everything that is there in the national government set-up. Is it more for the sake of acquiring more offices and employ more people? The former ARMM Executive Secretary, Atty. Nabil Tan, had this to say: “If devolution would facilitate and enhance the agency’s performance of its mandated functions, then we ask for it; but if it is otherwise, or would only inconvenience the concerned clientele, then there is no reason asking for it.” This is no less a classic guideline to rationalize the process of devolution to the ARMM.
Given the reality that more than 80% of the ARMM’s annual budget goes to personal services, or salary of its employees, there is good reason to look at opportunities available in the hands of foreign development institutions. This goes without saying that foreign assistance shall have to stay for good. But for how long, this is quite difficult to tell. Given five (5) of the twenty (20) poorest provinces in the Philippines, the ARMM has a lot of catching up efforts to do. With national assistance coming in trickles, the bulk of the funds outside the ARMM’s budget needed to push rural or country-side development, shall have to come from official development assistance.
This paper does not attempt to present a detailed evaluation on the performance of the ARMM. This is an academic paper constrained by time to be able to do such an in-depth study. Also, as designed, it does not reflect the developmental efforts of the different ARMM Regional Agencies in order to give pure focus and emphasis on the FAPs (foreign-assisted projects) efforts, though, one way or another, these agencies are involved in the FAPs activities. Most of the reference materials used in this discussion paper comes from the Regional Planning and Development Office, Official Development Assistance Unit of the Office of the Regional Governor, operational framework and performance reports submitted by the Foreign-Assisted Projects, and the JICA study on the ARMM. Based on these, the synthesis and analysis were made anchored on some given rural development concepts as defined by the World Bank and ACDA.

THE FAP’s IN THE ARMM: Nature and Scope of Assistance

As of December 2003, there were 46 foreign-assisted projects (FAPs) documented in the ARMM. Thirty four (34) of these are still on-going, 10 have been completed and 2 are still in the pipeline. Those that are still in the pipeline are already covered by project implementation agreements.
Generally, these foreign-assisted projects can be classified according to the type of assistance or sectoral focus that they address, viz: a) Capability Building and Governance, b) Health, c) Economic and Livelihood Enhancement d) Support Infrastructure, e) Gender and Development, f) Peace Initiatives, g) Relief and Rehabilitation, and h) Environmental Concerns.

Hereunder is the classification of these FAPs:

Capability Building and Governance

Title Funding Institution/Implementer

1. Local Gov’t. Support Program CIDA / Project Office on-going
2. Mindanao Basic Urban Services Project ADB / DILG on-going
3. Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services AusAID / DSWD-ARMM completed
4. ECCD Mainstreaming and Institutionalization WB / DSWD-ARMM completed

B) Health

Title Funding Institution/Implementer

5. Enhancement and Rapid Improvement of Community Health USAID / DOH on-going
6. Matching Grant program USAID / DOH on-going
7. Well Family Midwife / Technical Assistance to NGOs USAID / DOH on-going
8. Integrated Family Planning and Maternal Health Program USAID / DOH on-going
9. Fifth Country Program of Assistance UNFPA / DOH on-going
10. GTZ (Provision of Vaccines) Gov’t. of Germany/DOH on-going
11. Malaria Control Program (Sulu and Tawi-Tawi) JICA / DOH on-going
12. Participatory Compre. Health Admin. Promotion (PCHAP) JICA / DOH Yearly training to Japan
13. Follow-up Support Grant (PCHAP-related) JICA / DOH on-going
14. In-Country Training Program (PCHAP-related) JICA / DOH on-going
15. Women’s Health and Safe Motherhood Project ADB/EU/WB/AusAID/DOH on-going
16. Fifth Country Program for Children UNICEF / DOH on-going
17. Family Planning and HIV/AIDS Prevention KFW / DOH on-going
18. Hospital Development in Tawi-Tawi Austrian Gov’t./DOH on-going
19. Hospital Rehabilitation and Improvement in Maguindanao Japanese Embassy/DOH on-going
20. Polio Eradication WHO / DOH on-going

C) Economic and Livelihood Enhancement

Title Funding Institution/Implementer Status

21. Training for Rural Economic Empowerment ILO / RCBW completed
22. Training for Rural Economic Empowerment ILO-USDOL / TESDA on-going
23. Agri-Fishery Based Livelihood and Economic Enterprise LGSP-CIDA / DTI-ARMM on-going

D) Support Infrastructure

Title Funding Institution/Implementer Status

24. Agrarian Reform Support Program ADB/EU / DAR-ARMM on-going
25. ARMM Social Fund Project IBRD/OPEC / Project Office on-going
26. Mindanao Roads Improvement Project, Phase 1 Saudi Fund for Devt/DPWH pipeline
27. Mindanao 2nd Roads Improvement Project KFAED / DPWH on-going
28. Mindanao 6th Road Project (Bridge Component) ADB / DPWH on-going
29. President’s Bridge Project (SALAM Bridge, Phase 1&2) UK/Austrian Gov’t./ DILG on-going
30. Core Shelter Assistance UNDP / DSWD-ARMM pipeline
31. Upgrading of Hospitals in Sulu and Basilan Phil-Canada Devt. Fund on-going
32. Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project ADB / DOH on-going

E) Gender and Development

Title Funding Institution/Implementer Status

33. Muslim Mindanao Women Development Program The Asia Foundation/RCBW on-going
34. Gender and Development Mainstreaming in the ARMM ILO / RCBW completed

F) Peace Initiatives

Title Funding Institution/Implementer Status

35. Bangsamoro Women Peace Conference UNMDP3 / RCBW completed
36. Children’s Congress for Peace and Development UNICEF / DSWD-ARMM completed
37. PDC’s Strengthening and Partnership Building UNMDP3 on-going
38. PDC’s Multi-Donor Program Phase III UNFPA / DOH on-going

G) Relief and Rehabilitation

Title Funding Institution/Implementer Status

39. Relief Operations and Rehabilitation of IDPs MSF/ACH / DOH completed
40. Community Organizing Among IDPs CFSI / DOH completed
41. Water and Sanitation Project in PDCs OXFAM/MOVIMONDO/DOH on-going
H) Environmental Concern

Title Funding Institution/Implementer Status

42. Coastal and Marine Biodiversity Conservation WB / MRDP on-going
43. Kabulnan Watershed Rehabilitation Subproject JBIC / DENR on-going
44. Kabingaan Mangrove Rehabilitation Subproject JBIC / DENR on-going
45. Small Water Impounding System Subproject JBIC / DENR completed
46. Construction of Concrete Dryer in Kabingaan JBIC / DENR completed

ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE

The Health sector gets the bulk of official development assistance in the ARMM. By category or sectoral focus, 16 projects, or 35% of the FAPs, were concentrated on health services. The second highest concentration of the FAPs is on Support Infrastructure, followed by Environmental Concerns, Capability Building and Governance and Peace Initiatives. It is lamentable to note that Economic and Livelihood Enhancement and Gender Equity Development seem to be getting the lowest priority. If this is to be taken at face value, then the Official Development Assistance in the ARMM is missing the point in terms of addressing rural development. Economic and Livelihood Enhancement and Gender Empowerment, which are two of the most significant factors for rural development, are getting the least share of the pie.
The ODA expenditure by category or sectoral focus was not included because only very few FAPs were submitting complete financial reports. In the absence of complete expenditure reports it would be difficult to make comparisons, and for that matter, may be unfair.
To-date, the biggest single Foreign-Assisted Project in the ARMM in terms of scope and activities, is the Local Government Support Program funded by the Canadian International Development Agency. So far, it is also the most comprehensive project in terms of capability-building and enhancement of governance. It is being implemented region-wide and covers all the 99 municipalities of the ARMM. It has three (3) primary components as follows: 1) Support to Institutional Strengthening and Governance 2) Capacity Development for LGUs, and 3) Enhancing the Enabling Environment for Peace. It also integrates into its projects and activities the following cross-cutting themes: a) poverty reduction b) gender equality, and c) environmental sustainability.
The LGSP, however, is not a direct intervention for poverty reduction or rural development. It is anchored on the concept of “teaching the LGUs how to fish, not to give them fish”. It teaches the LGUs the “how” of doing things so that they improve on governance and service delivery. However, the LGUs differ in learning speeds and support resources. These two factors are important especially if it is expected that they have to implement what they have to learn.
The Agrarian Reform Communities Project, funded by the Asian Development Bank, is the next biggest foreign-assisted project in terms of funding. It aims to strengthen the Agrarian Reform Communities by training and providing them production support services such as farm-to-market roads, post-harvest facilities, communal irrigation, level II potable water system, and production inputs. Most of the projects implemented are farm-to-market roads followed by potable water systems and communal irrigation. As of December 2003, the DAR-ADB-ARCP reported having completed 31 projects in various areas in the ARMM amounting to Two Hundred Eighty Million Pesos (P280,000,000.00).
However, the LGUs find their respective equity to be quite a financial burden considering that most municipalities in the ARMM are still 6th and 5th class. Those who are able to provide the required equity complain of the painstakingly slow fund releases from the ADB or DAR. Two Area Project Managers in the ARMM resigned apparently due to complicated problems in the project. The National Project Manager also resigned late last year (2004).
In terms of funding commitment, the ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP) is the biggest project now on-going in the ARMM. It has a total funding commitment of $33.6M from the World Bank for 5 years. The said loan closes on June 30, 2008.
The ASFP was so designed to sustain and provide momentum to the efforts initiated by the Multi-Donor Institutions at the time of the SPCPD. In fact, it has assumed some projects that were identified under SPCPD. It finances regional, as well as, high impact community projects. The major project components are the Community Development Assistance (CDA). The CDA addresses community-initiated projects mostly in the nature of road rehabilitation, school building rehabilitation, warehouse with solar dryer, timber ports and water systems. The Quick Response Program (QRP) is an added subcomponent of the CDA to address the needs of IDPs in conflict-affected areas. Another project component is the Strategic Regional Infrastructure (SRI) designed to address regional impact projects such as construction of training centers, rehabilitation of District Hospitals and Ports. And the third primary component is the Institutional Strengthening and Governance (ISG) designed to strengthen the ARMM and LGUs in terms of enhancing their capacities in planning, financial management and project implementation. The ISG also supports strategic policy studies on the ARMM.
Most of the ASFP projects, however, are still on the pipeline. The projects are hampered by the elaborate project organizational structure and the complicated approval process. To this effect, the project’s governing board created a special body to go around and look at the possibility of streamlining some functions especially the project approval process.
The other foreign-assisted projects are not as big as the first three mentioned above considering that they are focused only on few municipalities or specialized assistance on specific sectors like health, environment, relief and rehabilitation, peace forums, trainings and seminars. If ever, they only produce sector specific impact and the kind of interventions are mostly palliative. Their impact on the holistic concern of rural development is hardly felt and the outcome of their respective interventions has not yet produced the critical mass enough to influence people’s lives and attitudes.

FITTING THE FAPs WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARMM:
(Or the Other Way Around?)

Since the start of ARMM’s operation more than a decade ago, the ARMM faces the same stumbling blocks and drawbacks in its pursuit of peace and development (LGSP Paper, March 2004). Over this period, the ARMM’s operation did not accrue to what was envisioned when it was conceived (ibid.)
The same pathetic view characterized the region today. Poverty incidence has been pervasive and even worsened with 68.8 percent of its population living below the poverty threshold. All five provinces of the ARMM belong to the so-called “Club of 20” or the twenty poorest provinces in the country based on the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is the latest measure of development advocated by the UNDP, apart from the Gross National Product (GNP) and the per capita income. The HDI considers the level of people’s access to basic services rather than their share of the national wealth which, in most cases, is hypothetical.
The JICA undertook a “Comprehensive Basic Study of the ARMM”, the draft final report of which was presented in November 2003. The study assessed the existing conditions, problems and needs of the sectors on health and medical care, education, water supply, infrastructure, agriculture and fisheries and governance.
The findings, in terms of issues and concerns per sector, are as follows:

Governance Sector

1. The changing priorities of leaders disrupt the sustainability of plan implementation;
2. The Regional Executive Agenda (REA) is not widely disseminated;
3. There is a need for legislative agenda to support the REA;
4. The REA is barely implemented according to plan;

Infrastructure Sector

1. Slow development of road networks that connect missing vital links;
2. Substandard equipment support;
3. Accelerated deterioration due to inadequate drainage;
4. Insufficient funds required to maintain existing infrastructures;
5. Unclear delineation of responsibilities between and among the national, regional and LGU-based agencies with respect to jurisdictional responsibility over certain infrastructures.

Education Sector

1. Low participation rate as well as survival rate;
2. Insufficient provisions in most schools;
3. Partially implemented the 2002 curriculum due to weak leadership in the education sector;
4. Peace and order situation and socio-cultural feuds.

Agriculture and Fishery Sector

1. Low productivity;
2. Rapid deterioration of remaining productive areas;
3. Lack of financing institutions willing to support this sector.

Health Sector

1. The ARMM has the highest maternal and infant mortality rate;
2. The rural folks in the ARMM has very poor health practices;
3. Inadequacy of health facilities
4. There is a need for comprehensive management information system to adequately monitor health problems.

Given the two-pronged modern approach to rural development, i.e. increasing productivity and empowering the rural people, the focus or concentration of the FAPs in the ARMM, and the issues and concerns in the ARMM identified under the JICA study, we shall now be in a position to make a rough analysis on how the FAPs are responding to these issues and concerns. Let me, however, proceed by saying that if the FAPs do not hit the bull’s eye mark in terms of the issues and concerns identified, we are not in a position to say that they are doing the irrelevant things. Whatever they do certainly produces indelible marks along the development path that they have chosen. The other point is, most if not all FAPs, have their own sectoral bias, or at least, they operate according to their given mandate and operational framework.
What would be unique is when they are at liberty to design the intervention package for ARMM, given the outstanding issues and concerns, and yet choose to hit them from behind. In this case, it is not fitting the FAPs with the development requirements of ARMM, but the other way around, and the ARMM just have to accept them because by all means it is an important offer and anything else have to adjust, or is there a choice? Indeed, with more than 80 percent of ARMM’s annual budget going to personal services, the presence of the FAPs is a necessity.

SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the region’s agri-fishery-based economy, and for that matter the country as a whole, the only way to increase productivity is to modernize farming and fishing. Then, the government must provide an efficient conduit system between production and consumption centers to improve farm-gate prices of agriculture and fishery products. The shorter the time element involved between production and consumption centers, the better for farm-gate prices.
Such projects as water impounding, communal irrigation, protection of the coral reefs, trees and mountains, rivers, lakes and municipal waters should get the highest priority because they are pre-conditions to achieving higher productivity in the rural areas. Productivity shall reach such level as to exceed local consumption so that the excess produce can be exported. This is where the government plays a vital role. The added net wealth, in real terms, to any country is its export earnings. Goods and money that circulate within may only be good for the local-based economies but not for the country as a whole.
Side by side with the above recommended priority projects, is improving the rate of technology transfer especially in the agriculture sector. The snail-paced rate of technology transfer is hampering productivity. One would easily recognize the awful disparity between technology users, as in corporate plantation farming, and traditional farming as in the remote countryside. And more awful is the fact that we are not short of technologies available in agricultural and academic research centers waiting to be applied and dispersed.
The human development side is somehow addressed by the more prominent involvement of the FAPs in the health sector, but still more are yet to be done because the problem in the health sector is so big that small projects may only be good at scratching the surface. Unfortunately, human development in the area of literacy is wanting in many respects. The much-publicized irregularities in the handling of education funds, is creating low morale in the education sector. The JICA study pointed out to weak leadership in the education sector and poor facilities, the probable consequences of which are the low participation and survival rate at the primary level of education. Of course, the main culprit is still abject poverty, that is why, a direct confrontation of this problem is very much called for.
The ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP) is in the best position to address enhancement of productivity in the rural areas. With its Community Development Assistance and Strategic Regional Infrastructure components, it can easily consider the support infrastructure necessary to boost agricultural and fishery productivity along the line of sustainable development. The ASFP, in fact, should work very closely with DA and DAR to effectively respond to the needs of the agriculture sector and the agrarian reform beneficiaries in terms of building and improving farm structures.
In the area of governance, and how it is positively influencing the lives of people, only the municipality of Datu Paglas in Maguindanao is outstanding. This once troubled town took a sharp corner and suddenly improved on productivity. Now, economic activity is very visible in the area. But we have seen in Datu Paglas how the “leadership factor” played as an important catalyst in the improvement of governance and change in the mind-set of people. Probably, if the young Datu Ibrahim “Toto” Paglas did not turn visionary, and set the example to his people, the municipality of Datu Paglas may not be what it is today. The LGSP has been very effective as a “coach” but the attitude of the players is another thing. That is why, despite best efforts, the LGSP cannot do as much in the other areas of the ARMM. Now, under a modified name (LGSPA), it is targeting all the municipalities of the ARMM. With more reasons, it has to produce concrete outcomes and its increased budget is in order, but managing the entire scope of its activities is another thing.
In fairness, the FAPs are doing fairly well in their chosen field of interventions for the ARMM but there are inherent development issues and challenges in this new geo-political subdivision that persist. The choice of the FAPs on how to address them cannot be questioned. Their activities and project undertakings are backed by carefully planned courses of actions, though more of the top-down approach rather than bottom-up, and to a certain extent, endorsed by selective consultations.
Very often, we hear people questioning the process of project packaging and the modalities of interventions. Ideally, project interventions should be demand-driven. In most cases, projects are demand-push because they were believed to be the right kind of intervention given certain situations and development issues. While demand-driven may not be necessarily need-driven, the point is that people should have the opportunity to express what they want and the project planners argue with them, and then agree with each other. This process may not be simple, but it is the only way by which people would feel some sense of ownership and some sense of importance. We knew from experience that this is critical in the success of every project.
If the FAPs shall have to inch closer to the business of rural development, they shall have to take the two-pronged approach of increasing productivity and empowering people in the rural areas. This is called the hardware and software components of rural development. The hardware component of rural development shall be addressed through massive construction of farm-to-market roads, communal irrigation, post-harvest facilities and farm mechanization while the software component shall be addressed through extensive health care programs, proactive efforts to increase participation and survival rates in the elementary and secondary level of education, functional literacy program for adults and vocational training for the out-of-school youth.
Despite the presence of 46 foreign-assisted projects in the ARMM, people down there are still waiting for their trickle-down effect. While project actors would argue that “we are definitely going towards that direction”, the “common tao” is growing wary. Ultimately, the FAPs shall have to help ARMM prove itself that it is still the better alternative to peace and development in the region. And because the ARMM needs the FAPs, they deserve all the support that they can get from the ARMM regional government.
We have seen quite a number of multi-donor’s forum with the intention of coming together and complement each other’s efforts. Instead of complementation overlapping and duplication still exist. For example, LGSP, for more than 10 years now, has been into capacity enhancement on governance and improving service delivery systems. When ASFP came about, one of its primary components is the Institutional Strengthening and Governance. Still, JICA is phasing in with its project “ARMM Governance Support Project”. There is no problem with addressing one and the same issue. Others may argue that they have their way of doing it and they concentrate on certain level of governance. But perching too many needles on the same hole may not be proper all the time.
The Regional Development Investment Plan (RDIP) is a good shopping list for the foreign development institutions which are willing to support development efforts in the ARMM, as well as the Regional Executive Agenda (REA) guided by recent comprehensive studies on the ARMM. These are field-validated studies that should be put to good use more than merely looking at them as active statistics. In fact, the RDIP and the REA should be reviewed in the light of these comprehensive studies on the ARMM to realign priorities and reorient directions.
On the side of the foreign donor institutions, it is always good to view things at the macro perspective level, identify some gaps and explore ways of synchronization, complementation of efforts and convergence at some point. On the side of the ARMM regional government, it has to be ready with its equity in terms of providing strong leadership, improving service delivery mechanism, and moving towards closer bonding with the LGUs.